This paper considers the supplier’s strategic delivery lead time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behavior on the optimal investment timing. In the presence of uncertainty on construction costs, we model the supplier’s option to defer the...

We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor's value of investment...

This paper provides a general framework to determine the optimal penalty fee to induce a contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We did this by i) developing a real option model to evaluate the investment timing flexibility that the inclusion of...

Disputes over penalties for breach of contract are often solved in court. A simple model shows how inefficient courts may induce public buyers to refrain from enforcing penalties for late delivery to avoid litigation, inducing sellers to delay. Using a large dataset on Italian public...

This paper considers the supplier's strategic delivery lead time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm's opportunistic behaviour on the optimal investment timing. In the presence of uncertainty on construction costs, we model the supplier's option to defer the contract's...

We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor's value of investment...