In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over … potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

matching by age, and (2) “differential age matching,” a formalization of the age difference at marriage between men and women … supermodularity is not necessary for positive assortative matching, and in fact many common supermodular functions lead to negative …