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Conte, Anna; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - 2014

whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma …-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of a different class than the social dilemma). We have three main … experience. Second, a mixture model reveals that the proportion of unconditional cooperators decreases with experience, while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337033

Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences

Conte, Anna; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2011

In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to report their contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plans data by a infinite mixture approach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009299538

Experience in public goods experiments

Conte, Anna; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 86 (2019) 1, pp. 65-93

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133328

Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences

Conte, Anna; Levati, M. Vittoria - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 76 (2014) 2, pp. 201-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345259

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Dannenberg, Astrid; Haita-Falah, Corina; Zitzelsberger, … - 2019

Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation and excluding members who show anti-social behaviors or attitudes. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992304

Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions

Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - 2016

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006248

Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions

Matsushima, Hitoshi - 2021

We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemological perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material interest. We assume weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214994

Voting in international environmental agreements : experimental evidence from the lab

Dannenberg, Astrid - 2010

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008660455

Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas

Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Köppel, Hannes - 2014

We investigate experimentally the underlying motivations and individual differences with regard to the participation in between-group conflict in nested social dilemmas. In our nested social dilemmas, the collective is divided into two groups, and individuals allocate tokens between a private, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337030

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Hatsumi, Kantaro; Berga Colom, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2011 - This version: March 23, 2011

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008988868