A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Kantaro Hatsumi; Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer. -- social choice ; public decision making ; voting by committees ; generalized median voter scheme ; separable preference

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Year of publication:	2011 ; This version: March 23, 2011
Authors:	Hatsumi, Kantaro ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka : Inst. of Social and Economic Research
Subject:	Medianwähler-Modell \| Median voter \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13, 4 S., 316 KB)
Series:	Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research. - Osaka : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2435-0982, ZDB-ID 2106942-6. - Vol. 809
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/92627 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008988868