A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Kentaro Hatsumi; Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa
| Year of publication: |
2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Hatsumi, Kentaro ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
| Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 153-168
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| Subject: | Social choice | Mechanism design | Voting by committees | Generalized median voter scheme | Separable preference | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336542