A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Hatsumi, Kentaro ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 153-168
|
Subject: | Social choice | Mechanism design | Voting by committees | Generalized median voter scheme | Separable preference | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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