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Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules : the case of endogenous income

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Llavador, Humberto G. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 39-60

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson, 1976 and Fellman, 1976, according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes - in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income - ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855846

A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality

Ehlers, Lars H. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 447-452

We consider private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule satisfying omega-continuity, no-envy, and one-sided resource-monotonicity. This result strengthens a characterization of the uniform rule due to Thomson (Soc Choice Welf...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505655

Multinary group identification

Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 513-531

Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704934

Multinary group identification

Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 513-531

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708381

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 211-247

procedures: the amendment procedure and the suc- cessive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that … the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference pro?le, extends … d omain of preference pro- ?les for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704808

Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1111-1149

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937302

Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Uuganbaatar, Ninjbat - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 9 (2018) 3, pp. 333-350

The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967421

Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

Peters, Hans J. M.; Roy, Souvik; Storcken, Ton - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 485-496

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505652

Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

Bordes, Georges; Laffond, Gilbert; Le Breton, Michel - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 469-483

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems. -- social choice ; strategyproofness ; voting

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505653

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