We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

We theoretically and experimentally examine a situation in which the principal has better information about the agent's ability than the agent himself. The principal can inform the agent about his ability by giving him performance feedback but there might be incentives for her to lie about it....

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance...

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance...

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

The paper analyzes the effect of team-size on effort in start-up teams. We extend the model of Kandel and Lazear (1992) to study the joint effect of free-riding and peer pressure, which both dependent on team size in our model. The special characteristic of start-up teams is their unique...