Showing 1 - 10 of 53
This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a game theoretic framework which explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects. It is argued that such a perspective makes it easier to analyse contextual effects. Moreover, the framework is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429811
Borrowing ideas from the medical sciences, we propose tentative guidelines for reliable causal inferences that cover aspects related to both the study itself and its fit with background knowledge. We argue that the current paradigm in economics tends to put too much emphasis on internal aspects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015084317
Establishing causal relationships is a core aspect of empirical economics. Borrowing ideas from the medical sciences, we propose tentative guidelines for reliable causal inferences that cover aspects related to both the study itself and its fit with the existing background knowledge. Moreover,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014632289
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376927
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736829
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This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175554
This paper considers the eff ects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041476
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199669
This paper considers the effects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165946