Showing 1 - 10 of 94
In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barberá and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343503
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We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271439
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May’s Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357423
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters of a society belong to this set, their majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, every such domain can be assumed to be closed in the sense that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490914
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In this short paper we provide two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely simple and allow a transparent understanding of Arrow’s theorem. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318869
In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318976
This paper continues Dietrich and List's [2010] work on propositional-attitude aggregation theory, which is a generalised unification of the judgment-aggregation and probabilistic opinion-pooling literatures. We first propose an algebraic framework for an analysis of (many-valued)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319999