Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions

Anna De Simone and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

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Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	De Simone, Anna ; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 15.2024, 6, Art.-No. 44, p. 1-9
Subject:	social choice functions \| weak preferences \| weak manipulability \| veto rule \| serial dictator \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Diktatur \| Dictatorship \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem \| Veto

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g15060044 [DOI] hdl:10419/330113 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271439