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employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930440
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discrete bonuses after they do sufficiently well. By adjusting monitoring intensity and communication of performance, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808020
the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576723
This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts … receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while rational receivers benefit from disclosure. The results hold …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420613
We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting …. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads … not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298722
about the asset? How do the disclosure rules of contract law influence the investigation decision? Shavell (1994) showed … rule, which requires disclosure of material information, but only after the contract is concluded. We show that this rule … can be more efficient than both voluntary disclosure and mandatory (pre-contract) disclosure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674107
investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve … sophistication. Imposing precise disclosure leads to more easily interpretable messages, but results in fewer sender types disclosing … at all. Since non- disclosure also systematically misleads naive receivers, the welfare implications of imposing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191455
We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182
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