Contracting over persistent information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhao, Wei ; Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic ; Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 2, p. 917-974
|
Subject: | persuasion | contract | disclosure | Dynamic | information | receiver | revelation | sender | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure |
-
Contracting over persistent information
Zhao, Wei, (2022)
-
On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
Terstiege, Stefan, (2018)
-
Information provision before a contract is offered
Kim, Jaesoo, (2014)
- More ...
-
Contracting over persistent information
Zhao, Wei, (2022)
-
Mechanism design and communication networks
Tomala, Tristan, (2012)
-
Secure message transmission on directed networks
Renault, Jérôme, (2014)
- More ...