Contracting over persistent information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Zhao, Wei ; Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic ; Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 19.2024, 2, p. 917-974
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | persuasion | contract | disclosure | Dynamic | information | receiver | revelation | sender |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE5056 [DOI] 1895106540 [GVK] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Contracting over persistent information
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