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Contract design with limited commitment
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
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Renegotiation in public-private partnerships : an incentive mechanism approach
Russo, Julio Cezar; Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães; … - In: Group decision and negotiation 27 (2018) 6, pp. 949-979
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943685
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Contract Design with Limited Commitment
Wambach, Achim - 2019
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
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Moral Hazard and Bargaining Over Incentive Contracts
Dittrich, Marcus - 2014
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890
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Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts
Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - 2014
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771
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Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts
Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
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Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Watson, Joel - University of California, San Diego / Department of … - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012887517
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Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Watson, Joel - In: Annual review of economics 13 (2021), pp. 631-659
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012612595
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013
This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - In: Review of economic design : RED 19 (2015) 3, pp. 173-209
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065