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Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

Luz, Vitor Farinha - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1349-1391

's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744297

Dynamic insurance and adverse selection

Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2001

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand … dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamiccontract has insurance companies offeringcontracts where the terms of the contract … on individualpast performance (like in car insurances). Weinvestigate whether allowing insurance companies to offer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318577

Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324841

Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information

Bloedel, Alexander W. - 2019

We study optimal insurance contracts for an agent with Markovian private information. Our main results characterize the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897939

Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information

Bloedel, Alexander W. - 2018

We study optimal insurance contracts for an agent with Markovian private information. Our main results characterize the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931503

Nitpicky insurers and the law of contracts

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre M. - 2017

that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … show how the law of insurance contracts should allow insurers to incentivize policyholders to exert an adequate level of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471

Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008

This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343931

Optimal collateralized contracts

Cao, Dan Vu; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2018

We examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and non-housing consumption. The borrower's private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919030

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372