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-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include … sense, individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is efficient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704962
This paper investigates - in a large heterogeneous sample - the relationship between social preferences on the one hand, and socioeconomic factors and political preferences on the other hand. Socioeconomic factors correlate with social preferences, and social preferences robustly shape political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714571
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708458
Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge election outcomes that affect everybody's lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic arguments as efficiency are available, polarized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625507
Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge election outcomes that affect everybody’s lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic arguments as efficiency are available, polarized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213858
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013539391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293860
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689054
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305201
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570166