Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,432
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392414
Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656
Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611965
Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568440
Cover Image
Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas - 2011
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307744
Cover Image
Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2010
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
Cover Image
Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas - Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", … - 2011
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422079
Cover Image
Coalition formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 2013
models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420285
Cover Image
Minimax Regret and Efficient BargainingUnder Uncertainty
Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869345