Savage motivated his Sure-Thing Principle b y arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if an event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has...

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit and Skeath argue that this seems counter-intuitive, and it is a challenge to the expected utility theory. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom,...

We confront two common objections to Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem; one to do with 'fairness', and the other to do with different individuals' having different attitudes toward risk. Both these objections can be accommodated if we drop the reduction axiom; in particular, if we...

In recent years there has been a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical challenge to Expected Utility Theory, the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm for modeling decision-making under risk. However, there has been relatively little work done in providing easily parameterized alternatives...