In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

In this paper we characterize efficient networks for network formation games with global spillovers, that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock on collaborative oligopoly networks. In particular, we establish...

Our paper belongs to the strand of literature associated with the notion of Nash networks introduced by Bala and Goyal [1] in the connections model. Our aim is to consider situations where agent i has concerns about the validity of information that she acquires from agent j. Independently...

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise...

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

In this article, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the popular “connections model” of Jackson and Wolinsky (J Econ Theory 71(1):355–365, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1996</CitationRef>). We prove that when heterogeneity with respect to the values of resources, or the information decay parameter, depends on the identity...</citationref>

This paper introduces a partner heterogeneity assumption in the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). Our goal consists in the characterization of strict Nash networks with regard to the set of resources obtained by players. We use the notion of condensation network which allows us...

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise...

In this paper we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the popular “connections model” of Jackson andWolinsky (1996). We prove that under heterogeneity in values or decay involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can supported as Nash. Moreover, we show that Nash networks may...

In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do...