At livestock auctions, the same purchasing agent can represent more than one processor. Repeated multiple-unit English auctions are created in a laboratory to measure the impact of shared agents on trade prices under alternative treatments with six, and as few as two, agents representing six...

The article questions the methodology of "economics and psychology" in its focus on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject hyperbolic...

Since January 2000, the authors have experimented with an integrated community-based research-education-service model that combined (1) funded research on the local economic impacts of the University of Vermont; (2) a sequence of four semester long courses to conduct the research, implement and...

Do people care about intentions - even when good intentions do not produce good results? In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions (the wage a firm decides to pay) and more modestly to distributional outcomes (the higher or lower wage actually...

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...

We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the 2 x 2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing the proposer's payout. We find substantial...

A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that for buyer-size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers...

We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage...

This paper studies the evolution and co-evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided...