We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing … is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated Nash implementation, regard less of whether the horizon is ?nite or in …

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences …

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems … exchange economy when preferences are single-peaked, the k-monotonicity is sufficient for the k - FTNE implementation for the …

-proofness ; implementation theory …

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that …, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the …

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general … implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy …-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised …

This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic environments with state dependent …. As such, it improves upon and contains as special cases previously known results about Nash and Bayesian implementation … et al. [12], can be weakened to the non-confiscatority and can be dropped, respectively, for Nash implementation. Thus we …

We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and private values. We investigate double …

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of (efficient) social choice … conventional models of natural implementation, it is shown that the equivalence relationship between natural price …