We consider a model of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information with ambiguity-averse agents who … insurees buy full insurance. Second, in separating equilibria where the low risks are underinsured their equilibrium contract …

." Using the insurance market example of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) I show that biases of high-risk individuals have … is possible, that a breakdown of the insurance market occurs. This extreme result is more likely in insurance markets …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals’ demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information …

to a catastrophe. Distinct from the existing literature on insurance cycles, we model optimal contracting by competitive … insurance cycle …

We document a large and persistent anomaly in the UK car insurance market over the period 2012-13: insurance companies … charged a higher premium for third-party (liability) insurance than comprehensive insurance (which includes third … that consumers are too confused or too poorly informed to arbitrage and that sellers of car insurance do not implement the …

In this survey we present some of the more signi ficant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance … complicated because insurance companies must take into account competitive pressures when they set incentive contracts. As pointed …