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The microeconomics of corruption : a review of thirty years of research

Burguet, Roberto; Ganuza, Juan José; García Montalvo, … - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590799

Corruption in public procurement auctions : positive equilibrium analysis, incentive mechanism design, and empirical study

Wihardja, Maria Monica - In: Journal of economic development 35 (2010) 1, pp. 35-57

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003960062

Extortion and political-risk insurance

Koessler, Frédéric; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane - In: Journal of public economics 120 (2014), pp. 144-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492045

Corruption in Public Procurement Auctions : Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, and Empirical Study

Wihardja, Maria Monica - 2009

We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first …-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders … and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720196

Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305201

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723

Public-good provision in large economies : robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015

In a large economy, a first-best provison rule for a public good is robustly implementable with budget balance because no one individual alone can affect the aggregate outcome. First-best outcomes can, however, be blocked by coalitions of agents acting in concert. With a requirement of immunity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334017

Mechanim design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132