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We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals with jobs that make them highly visible and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064773
We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070
return for taking on underserved tasks, and this prioritization increases as incentives power up. Bonuses may additionally be … used when incentives are sufficiently high-powered, but the optimal bonus is often non-monotone in the strength of … incentives. Our results have important implications for the design of worker reward programs on freelancing platforms such as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014359170
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339385
incentives according to each task's marginal productivity. By contrast, with a relatively large wage floor, the principal … gradually lowers effort incentives to avoid rent payments to the agents, even before the wage floor exceeds the agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125582
Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
agents is efficient. Yet a sufficiently large wage floor induces the principal to distort incentives if not dismiss one agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044149
This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent's talent when it consists of two components. The agent observes the first component of his talent as his private type, and reports it to a principal to perform a task which reveals the second component of his talent. Based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046363
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346
workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of … risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) representing a cross-section of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137206