Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We analyze explicit and implicit contracts in a repeated principal-agent model with observable but only partially contractible actions of the agent. It is shown that the set of implementable actions may increase or decrease if additional actions become contractible.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968140
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This paper studies the strategic interaction between a
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968169
In the aftermath of the international debt crisis of the 1980s reciprocal trade arrangements experienced a resurgence. This paper examines how countertrade can help highly indebted countries to finance imports if they are not able to use standard credit arrangements. It compares the credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968171
In this paper we compare the two standard forms of international investments in developing countries, debt and foreign direct investment, form a finance perspective. It is shown that the sovereign risks associated with debt finance are generally less severe than the ones which come with FDI. FDI...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993120
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The game theoretic discussion of best price clauses has alway implicitly been based on a durable good model with one generation of consumers. This paper argues that the intuition derived from this set up is misleading. By comparison with an overlapping generation model it is shown that the one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028236
The paper analyzes the optimal decision of a raider who can choose between a hostile and a friendly takeover. Empirical evidence shows that the transaction costs of a hostile takeover are much higher than those of a friendly one. The question therefore arises why a raider should ever wish to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028344
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