We ask whether young agents prefer to work in different-age or same-age production pairs in an overlapping-generations model where wages are reputation-based. We find that inter-generational teams (i) produce more heterogeneity in the old workers' reputations, (ii) generate a greater share of...

We construct a unique data set from succession and bankruptcy sales in Mauritius to investigate the determinants of slave prices between 1825 and 1827. We find that males, females sold with children, skilled slaves and slaves sold during the peak sugar cane harvest season all fetched higher...

This paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic principal/multiple-agents framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and choose between...

This paper develops a two-sector, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model to study necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of private tutoring, when education is publicly provided. Young agents have heterogeneous endowments of human capital, which they can augment...

This paper develops a model where two agents in different sectors face uncorrelated income risks and mutually self-insure. We discuss how the rent arising from risk pooling modifies the wage distribution in the sector where the employer behaves as a monopsonist.

We construct a unique data set from succession and bankruptcy sales in Mauritius to investigate the determinants of slave prices between 1825 and 1827. We find that males, females sold with children, skilled slaves and slaves sold during the peak sugar cane harvest season all fetched higher...

Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. We study this question through notarial acts on public slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835, involving 4,286 slaves. In addition to slave characteristics, the acts document the identities of buyers and sellers. We...

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection.This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamicauction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformedbidders and higher prices when an informed participant...

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamic auction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders and higher prices when an informed...