According to most simple agency models only the performance dependent part of the compensation drives the agent's effort decision. However, we show that this is not necessarily the case for reference dependent and loss averse agents. Based on Pokorny (2008) we firstly analyze the impact of the...

Ein typisches Ergebnis einfacher Prinzipal-Agent-Modelle ist, dass die Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten lediglich vom leistungsabhängigen Teil der Vergütung getrieben wird. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass dies nicht notwendigerweise gilt, wenn Agenten referenzpunktabhängige Präferenzen und...

We theoretically and experimentally examine a situation in which the principal has better information about the agent's ability than the agent himself. The principal can inform the agent about his ability by giving him performance feedback but there might be incentives for her to lie about it....

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

According to most simple agency models only the performance dependent part of the compensation drives the agent’s effort decision. However, we show that this is not necessarily the case for reference dependent and loss averse agents. Based on Pokorny (2008) we firstly analyze the impact of the...