Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolutionof cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly playthe so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixedpopulation of participants. The game represents a social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866640
This paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design:The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self-concernand the umpire modes. We study behavioral switches between self-concernand umpire mode and investigate the goodness of ten standards of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866910
In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors prdecting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandandi, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866980
Auctions on the Internet provide a new source of data on how bidding is influenced by the detailed rules of the auction. Here we study the second-price auction run by eBay and Amazon, in which a bidder submits a reservation price, and has this (maximum) price used to bid for him by proxy.[...]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867018
It has been claimed that people often prefer equity-like considerations and tend to ignore strategic aspects in fair division problems. Here, this is explored by analyzing whether or not such behavioral disposition is evolutionary stable. The answer however is ambiguous: Both, reacting to and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867036
This paper investigates (i) the robustness of hindsight bias in experimental assetmarkets, (ii) the time invariance of the different experimental risk elicitationmethods of certainty equivalents and binary lottery choices, and (iii) their correspondence.The results of our within-subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867042
In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permitwith the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given.Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one hasadditional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. We speakof greasing when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867100