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Incentives for managers are often provided by offering them performance-based compensation schemes. The efficiency of such monetary compensations, however, depends on several factors, among them the quality of the employed performance measures, the information available for contracting purposes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527797
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individualperformance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find thatthe principal does not provide individual incentives if it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860989
This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochasticinnovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861970
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In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the effect of performance pay and two common leadership techniques: Positive expectations and specific goals. We find that positive expectations have a significant negative effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011977160
This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular, we examine a leader who can - in addition to the use of monetary incentives - motivate a worker by adopting leadership styles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110227
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423971
This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular, we examine a leader who can - in addition to the use of monetary incentives - motivate a worker by adopting leadership styles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936032
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339385