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In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003609761
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452516
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005307798
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071563
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002274
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731228
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive. -- Additivity ;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731608
Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla [Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004) 869-887] as a property which induces a rich domain on players's preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731618
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003347881