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We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
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We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...
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banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue … bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with … adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers' rents, reducing their incentives …
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banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue … bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with … adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers' rents, reducing their incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989289