We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

of Marriage (1962) led to a huge and still growing discussion in the literature on two-sided matching markets. The … twosided matching markets, e.g., within the marriage and college admissions problem. The incentives to manipulate are … capacities - and are then compared for both problems. It is shown that there exists no stable matching procedure that is strategy …

decentralized matching markets such as multiple applications, late rejections of offers, and universities unable to fill all their …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

für eine Seite des Marktes existieren und bei größer werdenden Märkten in der Praxis sogar abnehmen. -- Matching … Stability of Marriage" (1962) led to a huge and still growing discussion in the literature on two-sided matching markets. The … twosided matching markets, e.g., within the marriage and college admissions problem. The incentives to manipulate are …

decentralized matching markets such as multiple applications, late rejections of offers, and universities unable to fill all their …. However, some weaknesses can be identified that should be addressed. -- Matching ; university admission ; manipulation …