Similar Search Results

A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

GOERKE, Laszlo - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1998

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505596

Market Integration and Strike Activity

Ana, MAULEON; Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2005

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negociated wage and the maximum delay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984715

Easter Island’s Collapse : A Tale of a Population Race

David, DE LA CROIX; Davide, DOTTORI - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2007

The Easter Island tragedy has become an allegory for ecological catastrophe and a warning for the future. In the economic literature the collapse is usually attributed to irrational or myopic behaviors in the context of a fragile ecosystem. In this paper we propose an alternative story involving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984818

Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers

Ana, MAULEON; José, SEMPERE-MONERRIS; Vincent, … - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2005

We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984845

Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2001

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985085

Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2002

union has the option to delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the firms to merge. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985140

Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2002

We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which te union has the option to delegate the … wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We … show that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985204

Product Market Integration, Wage Bargaining and Strike Activity

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2001

We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigage the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the strike...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985315

Efficiency Wages, Unio-Firm Bargaining, and Strikes

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETLEBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2001

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency … wage effects do not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium. However, if it is commonly known that the union is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985350

Une analyse économique de la sécession

GRAZIOSI, Grégoire ROTA - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2001

Cet article propose une analyse économique de la sécession. Il s'inspire des travaux d'Alesina et Spolaore (1997), de Berkowitz (1997) et de Bolton et Roland (1997). Le raisonnement mené au niveau des Etats est largement transférable aux collectivités locales (régions, villes,...). Le...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985373