Watson (2007) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotia- tion (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not con- stitute an...

This is a comment on Nomidis (2023). Using simple examples, the focus is on the conditions that lead to Cournot’s competitive limit result, showcasing the connections between the Cournot model and competitive equilibrium. Citing original sources, it is argued that the Neoclassical economists...

More than half of the HIV/AIDS-infected population today are women. We study a dynamic model of (in)fidelity, which explains the HIV/AIDS gender gap by the configuration of sexual networks. Each individual desires sexual relationships with opposite sex individuals. Two Markov matching processes...

We study the dynamic stability of networks in a two-sided economy of agents labelled men and women. Each agent desires relationships with the other type, but having multiple partners is costly. This cost-benefit trade-off results in each agent having a single-peaked utility function, the peak...

In an extremely interesting paper, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) [PV] introduce the axiomatic method to the problem of how to rank academic journals on the basis of their mutual citations. They characterize the invariant method as the only one satisfying a list of five appealing properties....

We first observe that two of Maskin's results do not extend beyond three players: we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique efficient solution for each...

We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is considered an act of infidelity....

In an exchange economyw ith a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistakefree) process consist of (i) all core...

Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payoffs around an...

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative...