We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Arbeiten von Jon Elster zum Problem lokalerGerechtigkeit. Das Thema dieser Arbeiten sind Rationierungsentscheidungen. Es geht um die Allokation und Distribution knapper Zuteilungsgüter, also etwa um die Vergabe von Kindergarten- oder Studienplätzen, die Zuweisung...

Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitationwhen patents are long and imitation cost is low. When imitation is credible, the innovator hasan incentive to postpone technology adoption for relatively high cost of imitation. Thepossibility of licensing eliminates...

Commitment is a necessary prerequisite for gaining sustainable competitive advantage. By the way of commitment a firm is able to establish mobility barriers for capital bound in specific assets and to protect thereby supernormal profits against competition by entry barriers.(...)

Recent econometric studies only emphasize the role of longterm demand expectations and technological capability. They neglect the impact of buyer market structure on innovative efforts of input suppliers....

This article tests the modell of Brander and lewis under ertrand and Cournot competition.

This paper reviews the Hotelling literature of product differentiation. The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of the market structure on price competitionand equilibrium differentiation. The existence of a general ’principle of differentiation’ is rejected. In contrast,...

This paper extends the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the multi-firm case. Considering locational equilibria we show that neither holds the Principle of Maximum Differentiation - as in the duopoly model - nor does the Principle of Minimum Differentiation - as in the...

To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producercan switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period model we investigate the impactof crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions, and we examine theimpact of license fees paid by...

We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over time.In our framework, entrants have to incur sunk costs in order to enter a market. After becomingincumbents, they disregard these entry costs in deciding whether to continue operating or to...