Showing 1 - 10 of 179
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599374
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812747
Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189019
I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multi-dimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599370
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306
We analyze boundedly rational learning in social networks within binary action environments. We establish how learning … induces learning (i.e., convergence to the optimal action for every agent in every connected network) only in highly … asymmetric environments. In all other environments learning fails in networks with a diameter larger than four. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189000
I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multi-dimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812746
This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599461
taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599505