" between the supervisor and the agent. However, asymmetric information between these two parties can cause a "collusion failure … manipulate the opportunity cost of collusion under this organizational form. The increase in the principal's rent extraction does …

This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing in combating collusion within organizations, or in regulatory … directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they … have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative …

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology … to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the … principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation of the optimal contract without collusion is collusion proof. Second, we …

This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set … implementable if the supervisor's information was public is also implementable when this information is private and collusion is …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

grand coalition is a known result. Finally, we study collusion in auctions as a mechanism design problem, insisting on the …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set … implementable if the supervisor′s information was public is also implementable when this information is private and collusion is …

We study the principal’s optimal response to collusion in an adverse selection environment. Building on the framework … study a stronger collusion when the agents can coordinate their participation decisions in addition to the joint play of the … the private information is distributed continuously. We characterize the set of implementable collusion-proof outcomes of …