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Inequity Aversion, Reciprocity, and Appropriateness in the Ultimatum-Revenge Game

Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008

differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772765

Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment

Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667907

Estimation of the House Money Effect Using Hurdle Models

Engel, Christoph; Moffat, Peter G. - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553336

The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

Langenbach, Pascal - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781566

Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness … opinions in an allocation decision. The setting allows for different focal fairness rules to be considered. We compare … the driving force behind this result: impartial decision makers deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751924

Fairness Spillovers – The Case of Taxation

Cornelißen, Thomas; Himmler, Oliver; Koenig, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

that such 'fairness spillovers' can incur large economic costs: A belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010567953

At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door. Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool

Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574249

The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance

Morell, Alexander - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different group identities among participants. They play a dictator game. Dictators either play with a recipient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212944

Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy

Gaube, Thomas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists’ charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633226

Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment

Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021692