misrepresent their ethics. The principal and dishonest agents benefit from an increased likelihood of honesty as long as honesty is …We study the implications of honesty when it requires pre-commitment. Within a two-period hidden information problem … committed to it. The principal may offer a menu of contracts to screen ethics. Both honest and dishonest agents are willing to …

lie about their ethics); the principal is able to screen between good and bad circumstances. In contrast, if honest … behavior is conditional on the contract being fair, the principal cannot screen along the ethics dimension. If the probability …

: task effort, honesty, and reciprocity. A second study examined the behavioral impact of two weak signals: regular … Light types were more likely to cheat and shirk in the honesty task, put forth less task effort (i.e., were less productive … in the honesty task. Additionally, ex-Prisoners were more likely to exhibit negative cross-task reciprocity. These …

firms can prevent the entry of unprofitable customers by “screening”. Although, screening generally requires a higher price … the price. It also leads to a “sales trap” restricting the sales to the profitable segment to a fixed level. Screening …

colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is …