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A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets.
Noldeke, G.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795298
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How costly is the honest signaling of need?
Noeldeke, G.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795308
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Information and the evolution of the utility function
Samuelson, L.; Swinkels, J.M. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136822
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Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games.
Mailath, G.J.; Samuelson, L.; Swinkels, J.M. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443490
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Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies.
Mirman, L.J.; Samuelson, L.; Schlee, E.E. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443520
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Strategic Information Manupulation in Duopolies.
Mirman, L.J.; Samuelson, L.; Schlee, E.E. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474630
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A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets.
Noldeke, G.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996
experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200464