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The investment game with asymmetric information
Coricelli, Giorgio; González Morales, Luis G.; … - 2003
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845178
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The investment game with asymmetric information
Coricelli, Giorgi; Morales, Luis Gonzalez; Mahlstedt, Amelie - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866876
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Age and the development of trust and reciprocity
Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - 2003
We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845176
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Age and the development of trust and reciprocity
Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different … age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust … research has devoted surprisingly little attention to their development with age. Our results provide clear evidence that trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866861
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Context and Interpretation in Laboratory Experiments:The Case of Reciprocity
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Miettinen, Topi; Rai, Birendra K. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010
The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter'sand the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation ofdata from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs(between-subjects and within-subjects) used...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248911
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Trust in cooperation or ability? - An experimental study on gender differences
Schwieren, Christiane; Sutter, Matthias - 2003
We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party's cooperation and trust in ability. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845180
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Trust in cooperation or ability? - An experimental study on gender differences
Schwieren, Christiane; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party's cooperation and trust in ability. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866903
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Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? An Experimental Analysis
Albert, Max; Güth, Werner; Kirchler, Erich; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867074
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Psychological Foundations of Incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2001
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005846399
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On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence fromthe Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure
Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut <Kreuzlingen> - 2011
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in-complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatumgame that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish-ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de-gree of first-mover unkindness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302672