We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independenceand conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities,called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special casesamong others...

This paper examines ¯nite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with par-ticular attention to di®erences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic (\price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

We provide evidence that people have preferences for data privacy and show that these preferences partly reflect people's interest in controlling who receives their private information. Participants of an experiment face the decision to share validated personal information with peers. We compare...

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and responder can share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a reward distribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). The games only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...

A small lie appears trivial but it obviously violates moral commandments. We analyze whetherthe preference for others’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratoryexperiment we compare punishment for different sizes of lies controlling for the resultingeconomic...

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships thathave been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment we find that harmdoers use apologies inparticular if they fear punishment and when their intentions cannot be easily inferred. Afteroffenses with ambiguous...

We study the value of information in financial markets by asking whether having more information always leads to higher returns. We address this question in an experiment where single traders have different information levels about an asset’s intrinsic value. In our treatments we vary the...

In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors prdecting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandandi, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al.,1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants'probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in...