I want to know:Willingness to pay for unconditional veto power

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested rewarddistribution in the Ultimatum (Yes/No) game. Although an opportunisticresponder would always accept and therefore should not be willing to pay forknowing the proposal, earlier results (Güth, Levati, Ockenfels, and Weiland,2005) show that offers in the Yes/No game are less generous and that responders,on average, earn less in the Yes/No game. By experimentally elicitingthe willingness to pay for learning the proposal, we investigate whether theseeffects are adequately anticipated or whether they are overstated, as observedin an earlier related study (Gehrig, Güth, Levinsky, 2003).