We consider a set-up in which firms sequentially adopt a technology. The technology is a public good. Late movers, upon observing the early movers adopting the old technology, (partly) infer that the new technology does not exist. This hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers...

Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable $\theta $ and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information...

We study a two-player investment game with information externalities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique symmetric switching equilibrium are provided. When public news indicates that the investment opportunity is very profitable, too many types are investing early and investments...

We report an experiment in which subjects may learn from each other. Specifically, a “queue” of players who are identically informed ex ante make decisions in sequence over two lotteries. Every player except the first in the queue observes (only) his immediate predecessor’s choice and...

We choose between alternatives without being fully informed about the rewards from different courses of action. In making our decisions, we use our own past experience and the experience of others. So the ways in which we interact - our social network - can influence our choices. These choices...