Showing 1 - 10 of 59
Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124038
In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124050
A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-Karlin típusú modellben lineáris készletezési és konvex termelési költség mellett....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124121
We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124141
In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124164
When modeling game situations of incomplete information one usually considers the players’ hierarchies of beliefs, a source of all sorts of complications. Harsányi (1967-68)’s idea henceforth referred to as the ”Harsányi program” is that hierarchies of beliefs can be replaced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124165
The solution of a TU cooperative game can be a distribution of the value of the grand coalition, i.e. it can be a distribution of the payo (utility) all the players together achieve. In a regression model, the evaluation of the explanatory variables can be a distribution of the overall t, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124169
Several game theoretical topics require the analysis of hierarchical beliefs, particularly in incomplete information situations. For the problem of incomplete information, Hars´anyi suggested the concept of the type space. Later Mertens & Zamir gave a construction of such a type space under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124183
In this paper we consider a primal-dual infinite linear programming problem-pair, i.e. LPs on infinite dimensional spaces with infinitely many constraints. We present two duality theorems for the problem-pair: a weak and a strong duality theorem. We do not assume any topology on the vector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124184
Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge-belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we introduce the notion of complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124193