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On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods
Bierbrauer, Felix - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502099
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On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist
Scarpa, Carlo; Calzolari, Giacomo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
(with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors …We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated …. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008048
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Time Overruns as Opportunistic Behavior in Public Procurement
Chiara D’Alpaos; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
This paper considers the supplier’s strategic delivery lead time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behaviour on the optimal investment timing. In the presence of uncertainty on construction costs, we model the supplier’s option to defer the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603773
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Endogenous Price Mechanisms,Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence
Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
-based regulation lowers regulated prices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385490
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The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors
Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828389
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Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard
Soubeyran, Raphaël; Rouvière, Elodie - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality …This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show … wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965188
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Restructuring Italian Utility Markets: Household Distributional Effects
Valbonesi, Paola; Miniaci, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
Competition in public utility sectors has been encouraged in recent years throughout Europe. In this paper we try and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385483
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Investment Size and Firm’s Value Under Profit Sharing Regulation
Moretto, Michele; Panteghini, Paolo M.; Scarpa, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
In this article we analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm’s investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a firm’s start-up decision relative to a pure price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423178
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Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence
Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors’ (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances’ regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230838
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Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence
Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
concerns of society, the stronger are regulators’ revolving-door motivations, and the closer is political competition. These …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230941