In this paper we test the effect of descriptive “features” on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where “descriptive” are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave...

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the...

While infinitely repeated games with payoff discounting are theoretically isomorphic to randomly terminated repeated games without payoff discounting, in practice, they correspond to very different environments. The standard method for implementing infinitely repeated games in the laboratory...

This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Endogenous group formation means that in each period players are free to choose among two or more groups within which they want to play the...

We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast,...