In the early 2000s, nearly two million men – and less than one million women – were eligible for disability benefits in Britain. Initiated at the beginning of the 1980s, the Incapacity Benefit (IB) social welfare system perceived and treated these recipients as « disabled adults ». This...

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard....

Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.

Hospital heterogeneity is a major issue in defining a reimbursement system. If hospitals are heterogeneous, it is difficult to distinguish which part of the differences in costs is due to cost containment efforts and which part cannot be reduced, because it is due to other unobserved sources of...

This article uses recent survey data from the Kayes area (Western Mali) to estimate the effect of migration and remittances on the technical efficiency of agricultural households. A theoretical model is developed, which shows that the more insurance is provided by the migrants, the less...

This paper provides a method to prove existence of solutions to some moral hazard problems with infinite set of outcomes. The argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a supermodular version of Hardy–Littlewood’s inequality. The method also provides qualitative...

We develop a "welfarist" model in which the collective demand for health insurance is mainly explained by a solvability motive : health insurance does not have for principal function to treat the risk aversion of solvent agents but to make it possible to individuals who are too poor to assume...

We study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce...