In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …

equilibrium of the game does not organize the individual data, two individual learning models are studied: one following a … predictive value of such learning models is found to be poor. …

equilibrium of the game does not organize the individual data, two individual learning models are studied: one following a … predictive value of such learning models is found to be poor. …

are also able to learn structural properties of the games. -- Game Theory ; Learning ; Extrapolation …