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We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703311
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045206
product differentiation, where the analysis of cartel stability under partial collusion points towards procyclical pricing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731493
collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737085
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674459
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an infinite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the effects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952833
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212777
product differentiation, where the analysis of cartel stability under partial collusion points towards procyclical pricing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108677
We investigate the relationship between market concentration and industry innovative effort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D race in which firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. With the help of numerical simulations, we show that such a setting is rich enough to generate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819023